The general perception seems to be that Russia has not been particularly successful in its cyberwarfare. There are probably many reasons for this, but it can also be an illusion. Only after the war ends can reliable conclusions be drawn to predict the role of cyberwarfare in future wars. The most powerful cyberweapons are disposable in nature, meaning they can only be used once and are therefore carefully considered and targeted.

Cyber operations are also closely intertwined with electronic warfare. Ukraine receives considerable support for electronic warfare, especially for electronic intelligence. This seems to limit Russia's ability to carry out cyberattacks as part of physical warfare. Therefore, it seems likely that cyber operations will be kept in reserve in case the war expanded regionally in Europe. On the other hand, Russia has a great need to use cyberattacks as part of its hybrid operations to influence decision-makers in EU and NATO countries.

Prediction is strongly based on historical data and its careful analysis. The lessons of this war will help us predict the cyber world better and identify the signs of cyber warfare in advance. The importance of anticipation is growing in the strategy work of both state actors and private companies. We have certainly already learned from this war that intelligence should be taken seriously, whether it is cyber attacks or traditional warfare.

The responsibility of decision-makers is emphasised, and understanding needs to be built because anything is possible and part of our “new normal”. ■